The
British Copyright Act of 1911 contains a crucial line. Clause 19(1) states that ‘Copyright shall
subsist in records, perforated rolls, and other contrivances by means of which
sounds may be mechanically reproduced, in like manner as if such contrivances
were musical works’. In order to establish a songwriting copyright in relation
to sound recordings (and other ‘mechanical’ contrivances) there was a need to
equate records with sheet music, i.e. ‘musical works’. Artistic copyright was
strongest in relation to the printed word or score. Here, authors and their
publishers received copyright income in relation to each copy sold.
Consequently, one of the methods used to establish this equivalence between
sheet music and sound recordings was to claim that the groove of a record was a
form of writing (see ‘Audio Books’ for further details).
As a
result of clause 19(1), songwriters received a copyright share in record sales,
just as they had done in sheet music. It was originally deemed that 5% of the
retail price of record should go to the authors of musical works. In
anticipation of this measure, various ‘mechanical’ copyright collection
societies were formed. These eventually morphed into the Mechanical-Copyright
Protection Society (MCPS), which was established in 1924.
There was
another consequence of the Copyright Act. Despite its intentions, it demonstrated
that there were differences between mechanical reproduction and musical
works. When it came to musical works, the author of the work was deemed to be
the songwriter. Songwriters were therefore the ‘first owners’ of these works
and were free to exercise their rights as they wished. Clause 19(1) crated a separate copyright for mechanical reproducers, now commonly referred to as sound recording copyright. The owners of this
copyright were not the songwriters, however, nor were they usually the performers who
appeared on the records. Clause 19(1) instead decided that ‘the owner of such
original plate [the master copy of the record] at the time when such plate was
made shall be deemed to be the author of the work’. The owners of these plates
were the record companies. Accordingly, they were regarded as the first owners
of the sound recording copyright.
Today, most recording artists receive payment in the form of advances
from their record companies. If they recoup those advances, they also receive
royalties. As Peter Martland has outlined, there was a
different method of paying popular musicians and singers during the first three
decades of the twentieth century. While a few opera singers and classical
musicians received royalties, this was rare for popular artists. The most
successful of these might be paid a yearly retainer to record exclusively for a
record company. When it came to making records they would also receive a
session fee but no royalties. Lesser-known popular artists would receive
session fees only. Essentially, they were being paid a one-off sum to perform
in a recording studio.
At the
time of the 1911 Copyright Act, these recorded performances were usually destined
for domestic consumption: most records were played in people’s homes. In the coming years recorded performances increasingly came to be heard
in performance contexts. As reproduction technology improved, records were more
regularly played in public spaces. They also began to be broadcast, forming
part of the repertoire of radio networks from the early 1920s onwards. And by
the late 1920s recordings could be heard in films.
By this
time the performance right for musical works was beginning to be established.
The Performing Right Society (PRS) had been formed to administer this right in
1914 and had gradually gained converts amongst songwriters, composers and
publishing companies. With the advent of new technologies, performance right
income became increasingly important. However, despite the desire of clause
19(1) to establish copyright parity between mechanical reproduction and musical
works, it was not generally assumed that this right existed in relation to
sound recordings.
In 1933
the Gramophone Company brought a test case to clarify this point. Carwadine
& Co had been playing recorded music in their coffee shops; the Gramophone
Company deemed this to be a breach of their performing rights. In the resulting
court case it was ruled in the record company’s favour that clause 19(1) did
warrant a performing right in sound recordings. In the following year Britain’s
two major record companies, the Gramophone Company (which by then had become
EMI) and Decca Records, joined forces to create Phonographic Performance Ltd
(PPL) to administer the performing right in sound recordings.
As the
owners of sound recording copyrights, record companies were now legally
entitled to all the performance right income earned by their records. The
recording artists, who they had hired to perform on these records, were not due
any money when these records were themselves ‘performed’. What followed is one
of the quirks of copyright law. The first owners of the sound recording copyright
shared their performance income with their recording artists even though, initially at least, there was no legal requirement for them to do so.
According
to PPL’s own history, it was their choice to give the artists a share of this income. In their
publicity materials they state, ‘This
intelligent and far-sighted decision was particularly remarkable because of its
voluntarily nature, bearing in mind that there was no legislative or other
external pressure on PPL at the time’. In its early years PPL allocated 80% of
its income to record companies and 20% to the artists on their records. These
splits were amended in 1946; henceforth 67.5% went to the record companies, 20%
to featured artists, and 12.5% to the Musicians’ Union (MU).
PPL also came under external pressure. Stephen Barnard believes that it
was, in fact, the MU who were responsible for artists receiving a share of
performance income. He has written that ‘Under the original [PPL] agreement,
revenue received for public performance of records went direct to the
participating companies, but this was modified in 1935 under pressure from the
MU, whose members could in law claim no royalties for the public performance of
their recorded work (the copyright resting with the companies themselves)’. He
adds that it was ‘New negotiations between PPL and the MU’ that resulted in the
share allocated to the MU in 1946. The MU’s position in these
negotiations is understandable. For a long time the organisation campaigned against
sound recordings, as it felt records provided a cheap and inferior alternative to its members live performance work. This stance was later embodied in the Union's slogan, ‘keep music live’. (Ironically, the 'keep music live' campaign, which was initiated in 1964, was funded by recordings: the MU didn't allocate the money it received from PPL to the artists who appeared on records, but instead used it collectively. The 'Phonographic Funds' were distributed in various ways: some money went to members who had fallen upon hard times, other funds were used to finance various large-scale orchestras, some was spent on a series of May Day dances, and a 'large proportion' was used for the Union's promotional campaign.)
Why should PPL concede to the MU's demands? Sarah Thornton has listed several possible reasons. First among them is the fact that the Union helped PPL to maintain control of its repertoire, as they forbade their members from recording with non-PPL companies. Secondly, MU members monitored record performances and copyright infringement at a local level, something that the understaffed collection society was unable to do. In addition, John Williamson has suggested that 'fear on the part of the record companies of a recording strike and a challenge to PPL's collection arrangements meant that they were willing participants in post-war discussions with the MU'. It should nevertheless be noted that the MU was only receiving 12.5% of PPL's money - there was a further 20% that was allocated to artists, and this money was distributed directly to the owners of the sound recording copyrights. Moreover, PPL continued to pay artists a share of their income, despite the fact that records came to be seen as less of a direct rival to live performance. They also
continued to do so despite the declining power and membership of the MU. It might be that another aspect of PPL's farsightedness was envisioning that the artists’ share would eventually be enshrined in law.
It took a
long time to reach this point. Section 5 of the 1956 Copyright Act clarified
that a performance right existed in sound recordings, but failed to mention any
artist rights. The UK signed up to the 1961 Rome Convention, article 12 of which states that an 'equitable remuneration' is due when recordings are broadcast or communicated to the public. There is a lack of clarity in this article, however. It states that this remuneration should be paid to 'the performers, or to the producers of the phonograms, or to both', and that it can be divided by 'agreement between these parties' or by domestic law. It was not until the European Union ‘Rental Directive’
of 1992 that the matter was settled. Article 8(2) ruled that ‘Member States shall
provide a right in order to ensure that a single equitable remuneration is paid
by the user, if a phonogram published for commercial purposes, or a
reproduction of such phonogram, is used for broadcasting by wireless means or
for any communication to the public, and to ensure that this remuneration is
shared between the relevant performers and phonogram producers’.
The UK’s
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act was amended in respect of the Rental
Directive. In 1996 a section titled ‘Right to equitable remuneration for
exploitation of sound recording’ was added. Clause 182D(1) states that: ‘Where a
commercially published sound recording of the whole or any substantial part of
a qualifying performance - (a) is played in public, or (b) is communicated to
the public […] the performer is entitled to equitable remuneration from the
owner of the copyright in the sound recording’. PPL’s literature explains what they did next:
When
considering this new legislation, and after lengthy deliberations, the PPL
Board agreed that the performers should benefit by receiving 50% of all
‘qualifying’ income on a track by track basis. This was a voluntary decision as
legislators declined to recommend any particular split of PPL income. This
meant that every single performer, whether featured or non featured would have
to register their details with PPL or one of the newly formed UK performer
organisations to enable their royalties to be forwarded to them.
The
featured performers are those who have an exclusive contract with the record
company issuing the record. Non-featured performers are commonly session
musicians and backing singers. PPL has fairly complicated methods for dividing this income
between the two types of performer. In general, however, the income is split
65:35 between featured and non-featured artists. This revenue has become increasingly important. In 2012
IFPI noted that ‘Performance rights income now
accounts for 6 per cent of record companies’ trade revenues worldwide’. It
would be higher still if it weren’t for the fact that copyright legislation has
forced record companies in some countries to share this income equitably with
their artists.
Finally, I
would like to return to clause 19(1) of the 1911 Copyright Act and its idea
that the copyright in records should operate ‘in like manner’ to the copyright
in musical works. The Rental Directive has brought a form of parity between
writers and artists. When it comes to the performing right, the songwriter
members of PRS commonly receive 50% of this income directly, while 50% is paid to their publishers.
The songwriters’ share is safeguarded in this manner because members assign
their performing right in their compositions to the collection society. Their
income from this right does not have to be paid off against publisher advances.
In a similar manner, recording artists now receive 50% of the performing right
income directly and this too does not have to paid off against their record
companies’ advances. There remains a fundamental difference, however. Artists
may well receive a 50% share of the performing right in sound recordings, but
this share has been established without any fundamental change being made to
the authorship or ownership of sound recording copyrights. In the majority of
cases these still belong to record companies. But, surely some light has been
let in here? The performing right underlines a conceptual problem that exists
when considering record companies to be the authors of sound recordings. If
artists are now considered as equal partners in the performing right, why not make
them equal partners in the underlying sound recording copyright as well?